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Bank  of  Dallas.  The  views  expressed  in  this  article  are  solely  those  of  the
author  and  should  not  be  attributed  to  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  Dallas  or
to  the  Federal  Reserve  Systen.A large  number  of economists  have  already  infljcted their
attentions upon  the attempts  of Mexico  and  the United  States  to
enter into a free trade agreement,  but some  of its  short-run and
long-run  implications  have  received  less consideration  than  they
deserve,l -Even-when'their  research  -ful  1y.'cons-i  ders'  the  -dyn  ami  c
'imp1  ications of the change  from  no free trade agreement
to free trade agreement,  economists  tend to assume  the effects of the
agreement  will  remain  in place  once  it  has  been  installed.
Over  time, much  pressure  may  arise to erode  the effects of the
agreement.  l,lhile  most  analysts  treat the free trade agreement  as a
cooperative  game,  the game  may  become  noncooperative  in later
jterations.  Moreover,  most  of the pressure  to ultimately  erode  the
effects of the agreement  wjll  probably  come  from  the United  States.
To  appreciate  the motivations  for erosion,  it  is useful  to
consider  what  insnired  Mexico  to initiate discussions  and  to recall
differences between  what  the United  States  and  l'lexico  get out of such  an
agreemenr.
I.  The  Death  of Hexican  ImDort  Substitution
ijexico is the United  States' third nost important  trading partner,
after  Canada  and  Japan. But historically,  the government  of lilexico  has
been  protectionist.  And  traditjonal  1y, Mexico  has  sold  more  to the
United  States  than the United  States  has  to l'|exico.
l4exico's  traditional  protectionism  was  part of a growth  strategy
that has  characterized  most  Latin American  countries since  l,lorl  d l,Jar  II.
Mexjco  based  its  trade  pol  icy on  the arguments  of Raul  Prebisch  (1950,
'  Although  the
i  nvol  ve Canada,  this
expected  North  American  free trade
di  scussj  on  focuses  almost  entirely
agreement  will  likely
on the effects of a
Dact  bethreen  the United  States  and  Mexico.2
1959).  Prebisch  argued  that the terms  of trade were  turning against
nations  whose  chief exports  were  rarl materials and  were  turning in favor
of exports  of manufactured  products.  But, instead  of focusing  on
manufactuning  for export,  .P,rebisch's  thesis involved,import
substitution,  In accordance  with the Prebisch  paradigm,  lilexico
protected  manufacturers  with high tarjffs  and  other trade barrjers, but
maintained  an exchange  rate pol  icy designed  to keep  the price of
imported  capital goods  1ow.
For  a while, this strategy  turned  out to be  consistent  with
persistent economic  growth.  Aided  by its  protected  manufacturing
sector, Mexico  grew  rapidly during  much  of the post-llorld l,lar  II  period.
Expansion  was  strong  we'l  I  before  the oil  boom  of the 1970s. Between
1940  and  1970,  llexico's real GDP  grew  at an average  annual  rate of 6.4
percent,  while  per  capita  GDP  rose  at 3.3 percent.
During  the 1970s,  when  rising oi1 revenues  stimulated  growth,  the
Mexican  government  spent  its  increased  income  by raising subsidies  and
other  supports  to domestic  industrjes  and  by  taking  ovelinsolvent
private firms.  These  steps  also involved  deficit  spending,  which  Hexico
covered  in part with foreign  1oans. When  oil  prices  fe1  I  in the 1980s,
and  Hexico's  money-1osing,  state-owned  enterprjses  were  absorbing
increasing  amounts  of government  revenue,  raw  materials exports  could no
longer earn  enough  foreign exchange  to make  foreign loan repayments  on
schedule.  To  regain  its  inflows  of foreign  exchange,  Mexico  prepared  to
alter its  foreign  economic  po1  icy.
II.  The  Abridgement  of U.S.  Multilateral  ism
lfhile these  events  were  taking  p1  ace  in Mexico,  other  trade-5
related changes  occurred  in the United  States, and  it  js  important  to
explain their  background.  From  the end  of ltor'ld  I'lar  II  until  the early
1980s,  the United  States  attempted  to expand  trade by means  of the most
favored  nat-ion  c:lause  of"the General  -Agreement  on'Tariffs  and  Trade.
According  to this clause,  any  reciprocal  tariff  reduction  negotiated
between  the United  States  and  any  of its  trading partners  would  apply  to
all  U.S.  trading  partners,
The  United  States  began  to back  away  from  this multilateral  trade
po1  icy by the beginning  of the last decade.  The  United  States  was
frustrated over what  it  saw  as widespread  cheating  and  foot-dragging
among  GATT  participants, and  unfair trade practices by non-GATT  members.
In retal  iation against  what  it  viewed  as  the contamination  of
mul  t i l  ateral  i  sm,  the United  States  commenced  a reign of trade terror
with countervailing  actions,  such  as  raising the barrjers it  had  lowered
and  increasjng  its  filings of dumping  charges.  These  actions
accel  erated  over ti me.
More  generally,  the United  States'  frustration  with
nultilateral  ism  allowed  the equiljbrjum  level of protectionism  - at
which  the pol  it'ical pressures  from  protectionist  lobbies  just offset
those  from  free trade  lobbies  -- to rise.  Trade  baruiers  in textiles
and  apparel  , and  in steel, began  to move  up.
One  major  victim of both  countervailing  actions  and  other
increases  in U.S.  protectionism  in the 1980s  was  Mexico. In retal  iation
for  alleged  dumping  by Mex'ican  producers,  the U.S. imposed  a 58 percent
duty on imports  of Mexican  cement. U.S. producers  a1  so successful  1y
demanded  countervailing  duties against  iron and  steel imports  from4
ltlexico. Moreover,  ltlexican  iron and  steel exports  to the United  States
are subject  to high  U.S,  non-tariff barriers, as are  exports  of
textiles, apparel  , and  agricultural  products.
III.  ltlexicols  -Trade  Liberral  i.zation
Needing  foreign exchange  and  a jump-start for  its  stalled economy,
the Mexican  government  moved  to subvert  U.S. protectionism  by opening
its  own  economy.  If  the li'lexi  can  economy  became  more  open,  how  could  the
United  States -- with its  declared  comni  tment  to free trade --  remain
cl  osed  to l.lexi  co?
Hexico  not only joined the General  Agreement  on Tarjffs  and  Trade,
but opened  its  economy  at a far nore rapid rate than it  had  agreed  to.
In 1985,  import  tariffs  ranged  from  0 percent  to I00 percent  but, by the
end  of 1987,  the range  was  from  0 to 20  percent  (Sobarzo,  1990; l5).
The  trade-weighted  average  tariff  decl  ined from  24 percent  in  1985  to
only 13  percent  in 1989.
In addition,  while  all  imports  formerly  required  import  Iicenses,
Mexico  dropped  licensing  for all  but l1 percent  of items  appearing  in
Mexican  tariff  law, or about  35 percent  of the value  of  imports  from  the
United  States  at the time. (See  Schatan,  1991) Mexico  began  to permit
controlling  ownership  by  U.S.  and  other  foreign  capital in a number  of
formerly  restricted industries. Horeover,  in 1987,  Mexico  established  a
special  negotiation  framework  for liberalizing its trade  wjth the United
States and  followed  up  with a more  comprehensive  negotiation framework
in 1989.
These  agreements  were  part'icularly compell  ing for Mexico  in the
late  1980s. To earn  the foreign exchange  it  needed  to pay  foreign debts5
and  to revital  ize its economy,  Mexico  had  to rely increasingly  on
manufactured  exports.  Under  the o1d  import  substitution strategy,
manufacturers  could  focus  on domestic  markets  and  leave  exports  alone.
Under.Hexicol.s.new  ci.pcumstancesl.  .that-,'strategy  -wou]d-not  work.  During
the late 1980s,  Mexico  successfully  tried to increase  its exports  of
manufactures  to the United  States.  To further open  U.S. markets  to
lilexican  exports, l.lexico  proposed  a free trade agreement.  In June  1990,
the presidents  of lttexico  and  the United  States  endorsed  the concept  of a
conprehensive  bilateral  free trade agreement.
IV. The  United  States' Motivations  for  a Free  Trade  Aqreement
If  Mexico  has  already  liberalized, what  motivates  the United
States  to sign a free trade agreement  with Mexico?  lihile ltlexico  has
liberalized, tariff  rates  not only remain  higher  in ltlexico  than  in the
United  States, but other types  of protect'ion  impede  u.S. exports  and
restrict U.S.  investrnent  there.  Despite  ljberalization, imports  of
computers,  autos  and  parts, pharmaceut  i  cal  s  , and  some  types of farm
products  and  of machinery  remain  protected.  ltlexico's  o1d  import
substitution  policies have  not entirely disappeared.
At least as important,  from  the point of view  of the United
States,  is the continued  restrjctjveness  of Mexican  laws  on  foreign
investment.  l,lhile  Mexico  has  significantly l  iberalized  these  Iaws,  they
still  ensure  that Mexican  investors  control  banking,  insurance,  radio
and  televisjon broadcastjng,  exploitation  of forestry resources  and  a
number  of other types  of extractive activities.  Moreover,  the lilexi  can
government  reserves  for  itself  the extraction of petroleum  and  natural
gas.b
V.  l4exico's  Motivations  for Free  Trade
Compared  with the United  States, l.lexico's  motivations  focus  less
upon  investing in its  trade agreement  partner(s) and  more  on opening
export markets.2,An.  imporntant  addjtional motivat.ion  -is to convince
Mexico's  domestic  producers  that the government's  turn from import
substitution is permanent,  and  that Hexico  will  continue  to concentrate
on the needs  of its  exporters.
It  has  long been  common  for Mexicans  to complain  that foreign
protectionism  impedes  their country's  economic  growth. Since  Mexico  has
iong  focused  on its own  import-substitution-related  protective  policies,
these  complaints  have  not carried  much  weight  (tle'intraub,  1990), Since
Mexico  has  for  now  turned  at least partially  away  from jmport
substitution and  toward  export  promotion,  these  concerns  have  taken  on
more  substance.
A number  of U,S.  trade  restrictions impede  l'lexico's  ability to
sell what  it  wishes  to U.S.  buyers. Not  only  does  the United  States
protect its  steel and  apparel  and  textile  industries through  "voluntary"
quota  arrangements,  but the U.S.  imposes  high  duties  on  shipments  from
Mexico's  important  horticultural and  fishing sectors  and  on  household
glass  products,  and  restricts the U.S.  activities of lilexi  can  trucking
and  other  transport-rel  ated  firms.
By  and  large, ltlexico's  foreign  market  is the United  States. The
United  States  absorbs  about  two-thirds of all  l,lexican  exports and  more
than four-fifths  of  its  manufactured  exports.  t^lithout  substantial
changes  in l'lexico's  export  patterns,  which  are increasingly  unlikely in
'  The  United  States  is already  largely  open  to Mexican  investors.I
the face  of European  economic  unification  and  Asia's lack of interest in
Hexican  products,  raising exports  means  raising exports  to the United
States.
l,lhile*no  -one--knows  the .ultimate-configuration  of-the North
American  Free  Trade  Agreement,  most  estjnates of its  long-run impacts
suggest  greater percentage  growth rates for  the lilexi  can economy  than for
the United  States.  There  are exceptions, Both  scenarios  .in  a study  by
Klopper  Almon  et al  . (1990)  suggest  positive  effects for the United
States  and  negative  for Mexico. But  virtually all  other  studies
(Hinojosa  0jeda  and  llcCleery,  1991;  Hinojosa  0jeda  and  Robinson,  l99l;
Peat  Marwick,  1991  ;  U.S.  International  Trade  Commission,  1991)  not only
suggest  higher  growth  rates in Mexico,  but rates  of expansion  that are
several  times  as hjgh  as in the United  States.s
These  conclusions  should  surprise  no  one.4 Even  though  the U.S.
3  Hino5osa  0jeda  and  McCleery  (1991)  show  real GDP  in Hexico  in the year
2000  at a I itt'le  more  than ten percent  higher  with a free trade agreement  than
under  post l{orld l.llar  II  poiicy regimes  or regimes  of the late  1980s. In their
model  , the FTA  actually lowers  U,S, growth.  In a more  disaggregated  model  ,
Hinojosa  0jeda  and  Robinson  (1991)  offer alternative  scenarios  for trade
liberalization between  the United  States  and  Mexico. The  great  majority  show
positive GDP  growth  for both  Mexjco  and  the Un'ited  States.  Peat  Marwick
(1991)  shows  positive  real income  growth  for both  the U.S,  and  Mexico.
Depending  on the scenario,  Mexico  grows  about  ten to fifteen  times as large as
the United  States. The  USITC  (1991)  offers only  qual  itatjve remarks,  but the
authors  clearly expect  percentage  lilex'ican  growth  from  the FTA  to be stronger
than  that of the U.S..  Sobarzo's  (1991)  computable  general  equilibrium  model
addresses  only the effects of alternative trade liberal ization schemes  upon
Mexico. The  overall effects are always  positive.  According  to Young  and
Romero's  (1991)  dynamic  dual  model  of the impact  upon  Mexico,  the long  run
effect  is a 6.5 percent  increase  in l'lexi  can  net domestic  product  under  real
jnterest rates of 15  percent  and  a 9.0 percent  increase  under  real interest
rates  of l0 percent, In sum,  the resulis of the Almon  et al  . (1990)  study,  jn
which  the United  States  gains  while  l'lexico  1oses,  are highly anomalous.
a  An important  difference between  these  studies is  how  they account  for
the effects of Mexico's  liberalization of foreign  investment  rules,  In a
discussion  of the Peat  l'larwick,  USITC,  and  Almon  et al  . studies,  l.leade  (1991)s
economy  is  already  more  open  to Mexican  exports  than the [tlexican  economy
is  to U.S. exports, the U.S. econony  represents  such  a larger market
than the l.lexi  can  economy  that the impact  on l'lexican  growth  will  be
greater. ...,llbile  l,lexico's  population-..is  about  one-third-that of the
United  States, ltlexico's  gross  domestic  product  is  less than 4 percent  as
large as  the United  States'.  Even  though  l'lexico's  population  js more
than three times Canada's,  Canada's  GDP  and  income  are nearly three
times  as large as  Mexico's.
VI.  Free  Trade  as a Pol  icy Credibilitv Siqnal  in Mexico
The  free trade agreement  would  a1  so help Mexico  to make  credible
its past  changes  in foreign  economic  po1  icy.  Credibil  ity turns out to
be important.  !,lhen  Latin American  governments  change  their  economic
policies, these  nations'  business  comnunities  often suspect  the changes
will  not last.  This  problem  was  particularly acute  in Chile  and
Argentina  in the late 1970s,  and  in Mexico  jn 1988  (Rodrik,  1989)  and
1982  (Riding,  1985).
The  academic  I iterature  on "policy  credibil  ity"  is a scholarly
consequence  of these  observations  upon  Lat.in  American  policies,  The
question  this literature poses  js, how  does  a government  make  its
entrepreneurs  bel  ieve it  isn't  lying?
This  question  js jmportant  because  lack  of credjbil  ity,  as Calvo
(1986)  notes,  is functionally  equivalent  to a distortion in the
structure  of intertemporal  relative prices.  When  a pol  icy is
argues  that they  do  not fu11y  address  these  effects.  Faux  (1991)  argues  that
Hinojosa  and  l.lcCl  eery (1991)  addresses  them  correctly.  There  are other
differences.  Employment  is endogenous  in the Almon  study, but exogenous  in
the Peat  Harwick  study.  See  Meade  (1991)  for particulars on the differences
between  the three  studies  she  considers,9
incredible, the entrepreneur  still  forms  and  acts upon  price
expectations. But these  expected  prices differ  from  what  the
entrepreneur  knows  would  settle out jf  the reform  persisted.  This
d  i  fference  "creates-a  second-bes-t  environment.  Even  though  the reform
may  be  welfare-enhanc.ing  under  certainty, overalI welfare can  be reduced
when  the reform is not credible.
Suppose  the new  pol  icy represents  a nove  away  from import
substitution  and  toward  export  promotion,  as in Mexico  since  the late
1980s. How  does  a government  convjnce  entrepreneurs  that the pol  icy
change-is  permanent,  so  that they  wjll  invest  in export  capacity  sooner
and  not later?  According  to one  strand  of the literature,  if  the
credibil  ity of a regime  is questjonable,  effective signal  ing  may  require
irreversible  acts such  as  export  sector-specific  public investments
(Aizenman,  1991).
If  the stream  of services  from  such  investments  would  be eroded  -
and  known  to be eroded  - by a return to  import  substitution, these
public investments  may  send  a credible  signal  ,  In the case  of Mexico,  a
public investment  shift  towards  projects that aid potential exporters  -
and  away  from  what  benefits  industries  viable  only under  protectionjsm  -
sends  the right signal  .  As  an  example,  Aizenman  (1991:  21)  notes
investments  in "highways,  tel ecommun  i  cat  j  ons  , and  infrastructure in
Tijuana  and  along  the Mexican  border  with Cal  ifornia,. ..  "
From  the pojnt of vie$,  of po1  itical  economy,  a governnent  can  send
a similar signal  by  destroying  its pol  itical  capjtal through  measures
that permanently  damage  a constituency  that benefits from import
substitution.  Indeed,  l4exico's  massive  reduction  of its import  barriers10
in the late 1980s  nay  play  this ro1e.5 The
additionally profound  aperture  of the l'lexi  can  econony  to U.S. and
Canadian  exporters  through  a free trade agreement,  in the wake  of
Mexico's  ear:l  i  e.r-  un  i  l ateral I i benal  i  zat,i  on.,  would  reconfirm  this  policy
commi  tment  .
A free trade agreement  has  the related credibil ity-linked  benefit
of establ  ishing a long-term  opening  to Mexico's  largest foreign market.
With a free trade agreement,  the opening  is more  likely  to persist than
under  an analogous  aggregation  of sector-  by-  sector agreements.  An FTA
increases  the security of expectations. For Mexican  entrepreneurs  who
rnay  be otherwise  discouraged  from  investing in plants and  equjpment  that
will  pay  off only if  the U.S.  narket  remains  open  for a long  time, the
FTA  may  not only signify a long  term  reduction  in admjnistrative  and
other  restrictions that are unpredictable  and  capricious,  but implies  a
conmitment  that new  restrictions will  not intrude.  (See  Harberger,
I99l;45-46)
A related  phenomenon  not only contributes  to credibility,  but
lowers  transactions  costs  associated  with international  trade.  An
important  reason  both for Mexico's  entry into the GATT  and  folits
initiation  of a free trade agreement  with the United  States, has  been  to
formalize  countervailing  appeal  processes,  so  that the United  States
could  not easily impose  countervailing  actions  without  extensive  due
'  In a somewhat  related argument,  Rodrik  (1989)  concludes  that
establishing  the credibil  ity of such  a po1  icy shift nay  necessitate
overshooting  free trade  by actually  subsidizing  imports. Aizenman's
model  expl  icitly  motivates  the taxation  of private investment  in the
importable  sector  to establish  the credibil  ity to the export  sector
po1  icy reversal  .  Mexico's  unilateral opening  of its  economy  may  be




process. As Schatan  (1991)  notes, a good  deal of concern  has  existed in
l,lexi  co over the United  States' aggressive  use  of trade remedy
legislation.  Mexican  exporters  are injured  not only  when  these  laws
result.in..the..imposition.o.f,..a-countervai:l,ingduty,-.but.when  U.S.  import-
competing  firms simply  use  them  as avenues  for  harassing  foreign
competitors. Import  -compet  i  ng  U.S.  firms can  injtiate  such  actions  with
relative ease  and  defending  oneself  against  frivolous sujts can  be
expensive. If  l'lexico's  free trade agreement  with the United  States
resembles  Canada's,  the increased  formaljzation  of due  process  through
bi  I  ateral  -trade-agreement-  I  i  nked  di  spute  settl ement  mechani  sms  wi  I  I
reduce  cost uncertainties beyond  what  Mexico's  entry into the GATT  has
contributed.  VII.  The  Potential  For  Erosion
In the first  two paragraphs  of this  paper, I  noted  that many
economists  assune  the North  American  Free  Trade  Agreement  will  remain  in
place  once  it  has  been  installed, but that v,,e  actually  may  expect
ongoing  attempts  to erode  its effects.  In addressing  this issue,  it  js
useful to begin  by offering arguments  on behalf of the original
contentjon  - that the prospective  agreement  will  remain  in place  and
that its effects will  not erode, This  contention  is at least implicit
in the construction  of virtually every  empirical  model  dealing  with the
agreement.
An  analyst  who  believes  expectations  are rational might  reasonably
conclude  that U.S.  agents  would  have  fully  antjcipated  any  negative
effects of the agreement.  Accordingly,  the United  States' entrance  into
a free trade agreement  with Mexico  ought  to signify a long-lived defeat
of U.S.  protectionist  forces.  Since  potentially injured  agents  knewt2
what  free trade would  do to them,  they must  have  fought it  with
everything  they had, and  lost.
A related argument  in favor of a long and  undiseased  life  for the
free trade.  agreenent  involves"the  difference between  a free trade
agreement  and  sectoral - or i  ndustry-  by-  i  ndustry  - agreements.  Consider
an argument  against  sectoral agreements,  The  benefits of freer trade
are often highly diffuse, while the injuries  are concentrated  arnong
sma'll  groups.  Suppose  the injured groups  are not much  conpensated,  as
is  almost  always  the case  despite  ex ante  promises  to the contrary,
Then  free rider problems  mean  that benefitted Darties will  not work  as
hard  to keep  or advance  free trade as injured parties will  to stop or
impair  it.  Accordingly,  sectoral  agreements  against  protectionism  are
hard  to reach  because  those  who  benefit from  them  are a more  diffuse and
harder-to-unite  group  than  those  who  benefit  from  the protectionism.
}lhy, according  to this  logic,  would  a free trade agreement  be  more
effective?  In the constructjon  of a free trade agreenent,  ways  may  be
found  to pit  exporters  who  benefjt greatly from  one  aspect  of the
agreement  against  producers  who  compete  against  imports  and  are injured
by some  other part of  it.  One  component  of the agreement  may  prop  up
another  because,  if  the exporters  do not work  against  the import-
competitors,  the whole  agreement  may  fall.
Even  if  the benefits  of a particular  U.S.  trade  aperture  are
highly diffuse,  exporters  who  do not much  benefit from  that aperture
will  fight against  closing  it.  Closing  it  might  cause  Mexico  to drop
the whole  agreement,  so that a Mexican  aperture  that benefits the
exporters  would  also close.  In sum,  because  one  port'ion  of a free tradeI3
agreenent  may  prop  up another,  a free trade agreenent  offers a good  deal
of certainty,  A free trade agreement  provides  a pol  itical  equilibriun
heavily  weighted  towards  free trade, where  a political  equil  ibrium
invol  ves  -a ba"l  ance  of -po1  i  tieal -pressures.'that  .has  .no  tendency  to
change. (See  Gould,  1991)
Before  offering arguments  that at least weaken  the above
conclusions,  it  is  useful to frame  thenr  by discussing  a common  sense
notion called the compensation  effect  (Brock,  Magee  and  Young,  1989;
Young,  1982), This  effect may  represent  a response  to a political
di  sequi  I  'i  bri  un.  The  idea of the compensation  effect is  that,  if  a
factor's economic  fortunes  decl  ine, it  turns  to po1  itics  for relief.
As an example  of the process  that generates  the compensation
effect,  suppose  that a free trade agreement  lowers  irnport  prices in the
Unjted  States  for some  goods  or services  that U.S.  establishments  also
produce.  This  phenomenon  js likely to occur  in some  cases  because  of
increased  conpetition from  Mexican  firms, and  jn other cases  because
U.S.  firms set up  new  operations  in Mexico.6  Some  classes  of wages
6  This last phenomenon  could  result from  Mexico's  liberalization of
foreign investment  laws  and  seems  to be of greater concern  to labor
organizations  than competition  from  Mexican-owned  operations  in li'lexico.  (Faux,
1991; Cypher  l99l; Anderson,  l99l).  The  concern  is not simply  over  lost jobs
in some  industries.  Labor  organizations  are also concerned  about  the downward
pressure  on  wages  that these  job losses  impose  on  U.S.  workers  who  remain
employed.  By  itself,  the credible  threat irnplied  by increased  opportunities
for and  returns  to U.S.  physical  capital investments  in llexico  may  hold  down
wages.  Studies  that show  net U.S.  job growth  from  the agreement  still  find
employment  declines  in some  industries  (A1mon  et al  .,  1991),  such  as apparel
and  footwear  manufacture.  Anderson  (1991)  argues  that newly  1ega1  ized
jnvestment  opportunities  and  low  wages  are not the only attractions  for U.S.
plant location  in li{exi  co, but that lax environmental  protection  there  will
additionaliy  attract U.S.  capital  .14
fall.7  This  reduces  the opportunity  cost  of lobbying  for the labor
1obby,  for example,  so it  expands  its political efforts on  behalf  of
protectionist  candidates  or a protectionist  party.  In response,  the
protect  i  on.i-si-party  increases-  its-equil ibrium level of*'protectionism.
The  increased  protectionisrn  raises the domestic  prjce of  importables  and
permits  an increase  in union  wages  that partjally offsets the initial
decl  ine caused  by the rise  in terms  of trade irnplied  by the drop in
import  costs.s In sum,  when  a factor's jncome  falls,  arbitrage  between
economjc  and  po1  itical  activity causes  the factor's lobby  to get more
for it'self out of the pol  itical  system.
These  allegations not only represent  common  sense  but, in some
circles, common  knowledge.  At the U.S.  congressional  hearings  on  the
l'lexico  -U.S. free trade agreement,  one  Mexican  busjnessman  noted  his
concern  that  "there has  been  a past pattern of the United  States
'increasing  trade barriers whenever  Hexico  becomes  competitive  in a
particular industry." (USITC,  1990;  1-3)
In the context  of the compensation  effect,  I  shall now  argue
'  It  is  comnon  to suppose  that Mexjco  has  an advantage  in processes  that
use  low-skilled  labor, since  Mexico  has  a relatively Iarge  number  of such
workers  and  their  wage  rates are lo$rer  than those  of U.S.  workers.  In most
studies,  U.S.  jndustries  that intensely  employ  such  workers  (apparel  , for
example)  have  the largest job losses  from  the free trade agreement,  because
these  industries  will  not be  able  to compete  easily with imports  from  ltlexico.
The  impl  ication is that the most  likely U.S.  wages  to fall  will  be  those  of
low-skilled  workers. Conversely,  because  of the abundance  of high  skilled
labor and  physical  capital jn the United  States,  the standard  argument  is that
U.S,  industries  that use  such  factors  most  intensely  will  benefit  fron the
agreement.  As a result,  the agreement  will  push  up the wages  of and  demand
for some  types  of high  skilled U.S.  laborers. Cypher  (1991),  however,  argues
that many  high-skil1  jobs will  also  go  to Mexico,  and  cites the increasing
skill  requirements  of jobs in some  types  of maquiladoras.
I  The  political  compensatjon  effect cannot, in the Brock,  Magee  and
Young  casting,  more  than  offset the wages  effects of the original shock,16
protectionists'  loss of their last battle, but the loss of a significant
battle in a war  that continues.
lihile the preceding  argument  may  not seem  compelling  in and  of
itself,  it-takes on additional  significance  when  we  consider  the
importance  of subterfuge  and  of the innovation  of subterfuge  in
protectionism. Here  I appeal  to the voter information  paradox  (Brock,
l4agee,  and  Young,  l99I), a dynanic  po1  itical  process  which  might  appear
in the United  States in response  to the dynamic  economic  process  -
described  two paragraphs  back  - in l,lexico. To  motivate  the voter
'information  oaradox  it  is useful  to note  that redistributive  behavior'
of which  protectionism  is an  elephantine  example,  turns  out to be  nost
successful  when  undetected  (Brock  and  l'lagee,  1984).  The  voter
infornation  paradox  is that, as  voters  become  increasingly  sophisticated
in their opposition  to protectionism,  po1  itical  parties  respond  with
higher  equil  ibrium  levels of more  opaque  distortions,
The  history of trade  I  iberal  ization is a history of this paradox.
tthen  tariff  walls are knocked  down,  quotas  appear. llhen  the use  of
quotas  is constrained,  "voluntary"  export  restraints are introduced.
The  development  of these  protectionjst innovat.ions  may  be expected  to
resernble  other  types  of jnnovations  in economic  life.  That  is'
'innovations  will  be increasingly  applied  as rates  of return  to them
rise.  Rising  imports  from  Mexjco  increase  the returns  to protective
innovation  in the United  States.
So  far,  I have  argued  that the intentions  of a Mexico-United
States  free trade pact may  be abridged  over time because  some  agents
will  become  more  sensitive  to their own  costs  from  it,  as its effectst7
set in, and  because  some  agents  will  devise  protectionist  innovations
over time,  I  have  claimed  that the free trade agreement  may,  in later
stages  of its  life,  be seen  as a noncooperative  game.9  That  is, as the
free trade.agreenent  reaches  middl-e  age,  .soft spots-'may  be found.t0
However,  an  additional  detail not only  motivates  erosion  more  fully,  but
motivates  an even  more  profound  erosion.
I have  claimed  that the erosion  of the effects of the free trade
agreement  is more  ljkely to occur  because  of U.5. actjons  than  because
of Mexican  actions. This  detaj.l  js directly linked  to the likel ihood
that etosion  will  tdke  pl  ace  at al  1.  Erosion  is most  1ike1y  where  there
is Iittle  chance  of retal  iation.  It  is when  the threat of retaliation
is palpable  that a free trade agreement  is most  effective,  because  of
the agreement's  propping  structure,  one  component  of the agreement  nay
prop up another  because,  if  the exporters  do not work  against  the
import-competitors,  the whole  agreement  may  go down.
In the case  of a free trade agreement  involving Mexjco  and  the
United  States,  the threat of bringing  the whole  agreement  down  is not
evenly  balanced  between  the two countrjes.  Not only does  llexico  benefit
e  Erian  R. Copeland  (1990)  offers a formalized  characteri  zat  i  on  of this
general  phenomenon,  but without  asymmetric  threat credib'i1ity.
10 A somewhat  different  but related argument  (Stah1  and  Turunen-Red,
1989)  characterizes  governnents  as subject to random  po1  itical  variations, so
that the Iife  span  of a particular politjcal  administration  is 1ike1y  to be
short.  The  model  identifies  potential government  types  which  do not base
their actions  on  the maximization  of a nation's  total welfare,  but focus  on
consumer  and  producer  surpluses,  respectively. Individual  administrations
support  either consumers  or producers,  but not both.  In the absence  of side
payments  between  the consumer  and  producer  groups,  but with short-lived
pol  itical  administrations  chosen  by a random  process,  an  infinitely  repeated
tariff-setting  game  may  ultimately  generate  the erosion  of a free trade
agreement.20
some  neans  to assure  that attempts  to reintroduce  protectionism  are as
transparent  as possible.  The  motivations  to return to protectionisn
will  continue  to exist.
It  should  be'noted,.however,-that'even  in the face-of  ongoing
efforts  toward  protectionism,  a free trade agreement  between  Mexico  and
the United  States is welfare improving, }lhat is  important  to consider
is that a free trade agreement  will  not, in whatever  form it  takes,
represent  a once-  and  -  for-  a1  1 abrogation  of protection.ism. It  sjmply
represents  a framework  that will  permit less effjcient  forms  of
protectionism  than  what  may  occur  without it.21
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